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PARTIES AND PROCEEDINGS ON APPEAL
After the appellantsfiledtheir opening brief, two changes occurred:
1. The Court of Appeals granted the motion made by appellant Grand
Staircase Land Company to be dropped and dismissed as party to this matter.
2. The Honorable Tyrone E. Medley, over the timely-filed objections
[R. 1337-1376] made by William Lowe, Augusta Rose, Grand Staircase Land
Company, and Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., [which made a "special
appearance" to object], consolidated the civil case of Pahl's Salt Palace Loan
Office. Inc.. a Utah corporation, ex rel. Diamond Fork Land Company, a Utah
corporation vs. KaLvnn Ninow. personal representative of the estate of Gary
G. Pahl. deceased. Third District Civil No. 020908627, with this matter. That
civil case was originally assigned to Judge Bruce Lubeck and then transferred
to Judge Robert Hilder before being consolidated with this matter by order
approved by Judge Robert Hilder on March 9, 2004, and entered by Judge
Tyrone E. Medley on April 15, 2004. The grounds stated in objection to that
order included the ground that this matter is currently on appeal to this court.
Based on the recent dismissal of this matter as to Grand Staircase Land
Company and consolidation of a civil case with this matter, this matter has
been styled in this Reply Brief of Appellants in the following way: KaLvnn
Ninow. Petitioner and Appellee, vs. William Lowe and Augusta Rose.
Respondents and Appellants, and Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office. Inc.. ex rel.
Diamond Fork Land Company. Plaintiff, vs. KaLvnn Ninow. Defendant.
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ARGUMENT
INTRODUCTION
KaLynn Ninow moved for summary judgment with 36 undisputed facts
[R. 588-697] which, when deemed duly admitted, do not settle the question.
Judge Medley improperly entered summary jud^pnent with 54 "findings
of fact" [R. 1118-1129] that vary materiallyfromthe 36 undisputed facts.
All the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom must be
viewed on appeal in the light that is the least favorable to KaLynn Ninow.
In so viewing the facts, during his lifetime, Gary Pahl entered into
agreements to acquire all 6000 outstanding shares of Pahl's Salt Palace Loan
Office, Inc., and placed: 3000 of those shares in the corporation's treasury for
tax planning purposes and to thwart his ex-wife^ KaLynn Ninow, in the event
of his death. Like all taxpayers, Gary Pahl was "entitled to structure his
estate's affairs to comply with the tax laws while miiiimizing tax liability."
United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 35; 114 S.Ct. 2018, 2024 (1994).
Since Gary Pahl received actual and potential tax benefits from this
during his lifetime, his transfer of 3000 shares into the treasury bound him
while he was still alive and his personal representative still remains bound.
To gain these tax benefits, he [and now his estate] did not have direct
control over the 3000 treasury shares, which were controlled by the directors
and are now in the hands of out-of-state owners. Attempts by KaLynn Ninow
to vote them have been rejected by the corporation. Reversal of the orders
entered October 1,2002; May 1,2003; and June 12,2003, is appropriate.
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POINT ONE
The December 28,1998, treasury stock agreement was raised early
and often below and was not raised for the first time on this appeal.
Pursuant to the terms of the May 6, 1998, Bill of Sale agreement,
after its successful completion on April 17, 2000, the 3000 shares subject
to that agreement [the Frank Pahl shares] belonged to Gary G. Pahl at the
date of his death on June 25, 2000, but they "belonged" to him indirectly.
Gary directly owned the 3000 shares [100%] of the corporation
that were issued and outstanding on June 25, 2000 [the Gunther Pahl
shares]. The other 3000 shares that were being held by the corporate
treasurer William Lowe as treasury stock [the Frank Pahl shares] all
indirectly "belonged" to Gary as sole owner of 100% of the corporation.
This was a result of the December 28, 1998, Bill of Sale Agreement
executed by Gary G. Pahl and William Lowe [R. 421] when Gary directly
owned the 3000 shares that had belonged to Gunther Pahl and William
Lowe was holding the other 3000 pending successful completion of the
May 6, 1998, Bill of Sale. The December 28, 1998, Bill of Sale made
note of the fact that the board of directors had voted to reduce the shares
of outstanding common stock from 6000 shares down to 3000 shares and
that upon completion of the agreement dated May 6, 1998, all of Frank
Pahl's 3000 shares would belong to the treasury of the corporation,
leaving 3000 common shares outstanding. Because the ex parte TRO
issued by Judge Sandra Peuler excluded William Lowe and Augusta Rose
from records stored at the corporate offices, while giving KaLynn Ninow
-2-

and her confederates unsupervised access, neither side has produced the
minutes of this board action voting to reduce the shares down to 3000.
In meetings held on August 25, 2000 [R. 424] and September 2,
2000 [R.425], the corporation's board of directors issued the treasury
stock, after which there were again 6000 shares issued and outstanding.
On September 5, 2000, all board members executed the written
memorialization of the board action taken on September 2, 2000. [R.425]
On September 6, 2000, Gary's estranged ex-wife, KaLynn Ninow,
secured appointment as Gary's personal representative [and she also still
hangs-on to her office as guardian and conservator of his now-adult son.]
Thus, at no time did KaLynn Ninow have the authority to take any
unanimous shareholder action, because, by the time she was appointed
the personal representative with authority to vote any shares, the estate
over which she had control included only 3000 shares that had belonged
to Gunther Pahl, but no longer indirectly owned the 3000 shares that had
belonged to Frank Pahl. This created a 50-50 deadlock in outstanding
shares that, as a practical and legal matter, ensured board continuity.
KaLynn Ninow argues a "coup" should be inferred. But the record
supports a reasonable inference that this was a moderately sophisticated
pre-death plan for corporate succession consciously put into place by
Gary Pahl for "tax planning" and to "thwart" any efforts by his estranged
ex-wife, KaLynn Ninow, to take control of all of his property after death
[which Mr. Lowe and Ms. Rose are stillfightingbelow as recently as
June 9, 2004 - (see addendum)] and that one of its primary objectives
was continuity of the board of directors in the event of Gary's death. As
-3-

set forth below, the legal standard to be applied to this summary judgment
requires the latter reasonable inference to be drawn. The inference that this
was a board coup or that a transfer of shares to the treasury never occurred
because sums were still owed under the December 28,1998, agreement must
be rejected as the one most favorable to the moving party. The reasonable
inference of a plan for board continuity put in place by Gary Pahl during his
life to thwart his ex-wife in the event of death and that any money still owed
by the corporation to Gary Pahl under the December 28, 1998, agreement
was an unsecured debt after transfer of title to the treasury on April 17, 2000,
must still be accepted as the one most favorable to the non-moving parties.
The argument made by KaLynn Ninow at ] JB. of her appeal acrgument
that the December 28, 1998, treasury stock agreement is an offer of "facts
before this Court that were not properly before the trial court when it decided
the motion for summary judgment" is so frivolous as to warrant sanctions
under URAP 33. William Lowe and Augusta Rose relied upon the December
28, 1998, agreement in the trial court early and often. It was before the court
as early as May 27, 2002 [R. 421], having been filed by William Lowe and
Augusta Rose when Robert Henry Copier was the attorney for only William
Lowe herein and Augusta Rose was a pro se litigant who had not yet retained
Mr. Copier. The main argument in opposition to KaLynn Ninow's motion for
summary judgment was that KaLynn Ninow had filed a prolix list of 36 facts
that did not settle the question or include facts material to the issues. Central
to the issues below was this December 28,1998, agreement, which was not

offered for the first time on appeal. [Appellee's Brief at 12] Not only was
the important fact of the existence of this December 28, 1998, treasury
stock agreement presented to the trial court early and often, but, after it
was first presented on May 27, 2002 [R. 421], KaLynn Ninow filed her
own copy of the document [R. 461] appended to an affidavit [R. 427]
claiming it had been turned over by William Lowe on May 23, 2002, and
she then addressed this December 28, 1998, treasury stock agreement by
arguing [incorrectly] that "there is no evidence that the Board of Directors
ever did vote to reduce the shares" [R. 482] even though the December
28, 1998, treasury stock agreement states in its text that such a vote had
taken place, it was signed by Gary G. Pahl [who was one of the directors
and had personal knowledge that such a vote had taken place], and
KaLynn Ninow conceded he was one of the directors. [R. 482] She
further recognized the significance and impact of the December 28, 1998,
treasury stock agreement below by arguing [incorrectly] that subsequent
issuance of the treasury stock by the corporation immediately prior to her
appointment as personal representative had been a conflicting interest
transaction that violated the articles and bylaws of the corporation. [R.
483] She also argued [incorrectly] that the December 28, 1998, treasury
stock agreement required further payments to be made by the corporation
before the shares became treasury shares. [R. 482] Of course, when the
facts and reasonable inferences are properly viewed in the light most
favorable to the non-moving parties, no further payments were required
and the board properly issued shares that had become treasury shares on
-5-

conditions it deemed reasonable, rendering her argument unavailing for
summary judgment. She cannot now prevail in her contention that the
December 28, 1998, treasury stock agreement is being raised for the first
time on appeal, since she herself expressly argued its implications below.
Apparently recognizing that all of the arguments that she had
already made below regarding the December 28, 1998, treasury stock
agreement were fact-sensitive and precluded summary judgment, she
moved for summary judgment by listing some facts that were not in
dispute and failed to list facts pertaining to the December 28, 1998,
agreement. As they did below, William Lowe and Augusta Rose oppose
the summary judgment because of this failure to list the material facts
that address this central December 28, 1998 treasury stock agreement.
POINT TWO
The October 1, 2002, contempt order should be reversed and
the May 1, 2003, summary judgment should either be reversed or be
the subject of appellate guidance as to its limited reach and effect
By virtue of Judge Hilder's order of November 26, 2002, title to
3000 treasury shares is now vested in out-of-state owners who are not
parties to this proceeding and William Lowe and Augusta Rose continue
to serve as a quorum of directors due to the 50-50 shareholder deadlock.
Thus, it may be unnecessary to reverse the May 1, 2003, judgment
and it may be sufficient to give the trial court guidance as to the limited
reach and effect of its May 1, 2003, order. See Armed Forces Ins v.
Harrison, 2003 UT 14, Par. 38, 70 P.3rd 35 [unnecessary to reach some
appeal issues but "in the interest of judicial economy, fdiscussion of these
issues is appropriate as guidance for the trial court',f (citation omitted).
-6-

This is an appeal of an interlocutory order of contempt entered on
October 1, 2002, and afinalsummary judgment entered on May 1, 2003, in a
probate proceeding initiated by KaLynn Ninow, personal representative of the
late Gary G. Pahl. Ms. Ninow concedes in her brief that the May 1, 2003,
summary judgment is a final and appealable order. [Appellee's Brief at 21].
KaLynn Ninow has now caused the November 26,2002, default
judgment entered against her in a related civil case to be consolidated with
this probate. Copies are in the numbered record on appeal [R. 1315]
As set forth in Point Three below, the November 26, 2002, judgment
should be affirmed on appeal as the final order on the subject 3000 shares.
The June 12, 2003, order [R. 1321] setting it aside should be reversed.
The May 1,2003, summary judgment [R. 1283] orders, adjudges, and
decrees that "Gary Pahl was the owner of all 6,000 shares of stock of Pahl's
Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., at the time of his death, and all of said 6,000
shares are part of the property belonging to the Estate of Gary Pahl, and to
Ryan Pahl as the only devisee [sic] of the Estate." We urge reversal, since
appellate review of a summary judgment requires the facts and reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom to be viewed in thefightmost favorable to the
non-moving party. When that standard is applied, Gary Pahl owned 3000
shares and the other 3000 shares were held at the time of death by corporate
treasurer William Lowe as treasury stock, they were subsequently transferred
to out-of-state owners, and Judge Medley had neither personal jurisdiction
over the shareowners nor in rem jurisdiction over the shares on May 1, 2003.
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Appellee's brief fails to meet or address the arguments raised in
appellants' opening brief regarding the application of the Utah Rules of
Evidence to the uncertainties regarding missing corporate documents created
by a TRO that did not preserve the status quo, but summarily, radically, and
irrevocably altered the status quo on a surprise ex parte basis. Opposition
thereto having been waived, those arguments should be accepted on appeal.
While a trier of fact might decide KaLynn Ninow did not destroy or
hide documents, she is not entitled to that inference on a summary judgment.
Ms. Ninow's incomplete statement of undisputed facts in the trial court
established only that Gary Pahl owned all 6000 shares at the date of death.
This was a matter not in dispute, since he directly owned 3000 shares
outstanding and indirectly owned the other 3000 shares in the treasury. The
listed facts did not establish that all 6000 shares were in the estate when Ms.
Ninow was appointed to her offices in 2000 or when she first attempted to
vote all 6000 shares in 2002. Since the listed facts are not disputed, but also
do not settle the question, it was not necessary for parties opposing summary
judgment to list and respond to them, because they were deemed admitted
under CJA 4-501 [now repealed] to the extent that they were supported by
accurate reference to the record. Instead, pursuant to CJA 4-501, the parties
opposing summary judgment properly listed some disputed questions of fact
with references to affidavits in the record. When the facts embodied in these
disputed questions of fact and referenced affidavits are viewed in the light
most favorable to the non-moving parties, summary judgment is defeated.
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Contrary to the assertion made by KaLynn Ninow at I. B. of her appeal
argument, even if all of the undisputed material facts listed by KaLynn Ninow
are all deemed to be true for purposes of summary judgment, they still do not
establish an entitlement to summary judgment, because they do not address
Frank Pahl's conveyance of his 3000 shares to William Lowe under the May
6,1998, bill of sale agreement [after which they were held by William Lowe
in trust] or the conveyance of those shares by Gary Pahl to the corporation's
treasury by virtue of the December 28,1998, bill of sale agreement [by virtue
of which they were treasury stock held by William Lowe as the corporate
treasurer after April 17, 2000, the date of successful completion of the May 6,
1998, bill of sale agreement, and remained treasury shares until transferred
out of the treasury pursuant to action of the directors]. Since it was not
disputed that at the time of death Gary Pahl owned all 6000 shares [3000
directly and 3000 treasury shares indirectly], the factual dispute was over
share transfers not addressed by KaLynn Ninow in her statement of facts.
The disputed facts pertaining to these further transfers were raised in
opposition to summary judgment as disputed facts listed in the Memorandum
Opposing KaLynn Ninow's Motion for Summary Judgment [R. 806-812]:
"DISPUTED ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT
"J. Does KaLynn Ninow own less than a quorum of shares in
Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., since Frank Pahl conveyed his
3000 shares to William Lowe and William Lowe never conveyed
those shares to Gary Pahl before Gary Pahl's death or to KaLynn
Ninow after Gary Pahl's death? (Initial and additional affidavits of
Frank Pahl; Affidavit of William Lowe; Affidavit of Augusta Rose.)
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"2. Does KaLynn Ninow own less than a quorum of shares
in Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., since Gary Pahl conveyed
3000 shares to the corporation and placed those 3000 shares
under the full control of the corporation Js board of directors as
treasury stock before his death and the board never voted to
convey those treasury shares to Gary Pahl before Gary Pahl ys
death or to KaLynn Ninow after Gary Pahl's death? (Affidavit of
William Lowe; Affidavit of Augusta Rose.) "

From appellants' "Memorandum Opposing KaLynn Ninow's Motion
for Summary Judgmenf\ timelyfiledon August 9, 2002, R. 806-812]
The memorandum also argued that Ms. Ninow had not addressed all
share transfers in her statement of facts and that the court lacked in rem and
subject matter jurisdiction over shares owned by non-parties: [R. 806-812]:
'POINT ONE
Since Diamond Fork Land Company is not a party, this court cannot
summarily deprive it of its 1500 PahVs Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., shares."
"UCASec. 75-3-105(1) provides:
i(

Persons interested in decedents' estates may apply to the registrar
for determination in the informal proceedings provided in this
chapter and may petition the court for orders in formal proceedings
within the court's jurisdiction, including, but not limited to those
described in this chapter. The court may hear and determine formal
proceedings involving administration and distribution of decedents'
estates after notice to interested persons in conformity with Section
75-1-401. Persons notified are bound though less than all
interested persons may have been given notice. [Emphasis added ]"
<(

Diamond Fork Land Company cannot be summarily deprived of its ownership of

1500 . . . shares. " ". . .Lowe and. . . Rose . . . hm>e never been removed as directors and
are the sole possessors of corporate institutional memory going back to Gary Pahl. "
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While Ms. Ninow concedes that the May 1,2003, summary judgment
is afinalorder timely appealed, she argues the contempt order of October 1,
2002, was afinalorder not timely appealed. This court already ruled in this
case on October 28, 2003, mat, consistent with the general rule, the October
1,2002, civil contempt order is notfinal,but interlocutory [citing Von Hake v.
Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1998)]. The civil contempt order held William
Lowe in contempt for an action he took after the TRO inadvertently expired
when KaLynn Ninow's counsel failed to get a timely extension. As more
fully discussed in Point Four below, the text of Rule 65A as iUuminated by
precedent does not give trial courts such authority to retroactively extend a
TRO to restrain past conduct. Ms. Ninow wishes to see the power of courts
enlarged with such retroactive power in order to chill thefreedomof litigants
who face the possibility of such a retroactive order, using the demolition of a
hypothetical historic building as a reason. As under Roman Law it was better
that ten guilty persons gofreethan one innocent person be punished, under
our modern core legal principles of ordered liberty under rule of law it is
better that an old building be demolished than the law be expanded to give
state judges the authority to retroactively restrain and punish historic conduct.
Returning now to the May 1, 2003, summary judgment, facts and all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom must all be viewed by the appellate
court in the light that is most favorable to the non-moving party. Dick Simon
Trucking, Inc.. v. State Tax Commission. 2004 UT 11. In cross-motions for
summary judgment, separately viewed facts and reasonable inferences drawn
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therefrom must all be viewed in the light least favorable to KaLynn Ninow,
the "moving" party. Prince. Yeates & Geldzahler v. Young. 2004 UT 26.
With these principles in mind, the facts are as follows. At the time of
his death, Gary G. Pahl directly owned 3000 shares [100%] of outstanding
stock in Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., and indirectly owned the other
3000 authorized shares held by the corporation's treasurer, William Lowe, as
treasury stock of the corporation, Gary G. Pahl's death on June 25,2000,
created a vacancy in the position he previously held on the corporation's
three-person board of directors. The surviving directors, William Lowe and
Augusta Rose, were authorized to and continued to conduct board business as
a quorum of the board of directors and also continued to conduct corporate
business and engage in corporate business operations as the officers of the
corporation. Acting with that authority, William Lowe and Augusta Rose
caused the 3000 shares of stock in the treasury to be transferredfromthe
treasury, after which the 3000 shares changed hands several times and are
now held out-of-state by out-of-state owners not parties to the probate
proceeding below. Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., which was not a
party to the probate proceeding below, became concerned that the probate
proceeding was creating a cloud over its shareholder hst and brought a civil
action against KaLynn Ninow in her capacity as personal representative of the
estate of Gary G. Pahl. Default judgment was entered in which, under the
authority granted to the court under URCP 70, the trial court in that case
divested KaLynn Ninow's title, if any, to 3000 shares and vested it in the out-
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of-state owners listed by the corporation on its shareholder list, none of whom
were parties to that case. After waiting three months to ensure the default
judgment would not be set aside under URCP 60(b), those out-of-state
owners sold the shares to other out-of-state bonafidepurchasers and the
3000 shares remain out-of-state in the hands of out-of-state owners. The
default judgment was subsequently set aside, but, since the out-of-state
owners in whom title to the 3000 shares had been vested by the trial court
were not parties to the case, setting aside the default judgment did not redivest titlefromthose out-of-state owners and did not re-vest title with the
personal representative, since the trial court had no power to do so under
URCP 70 once the property was out-of-state and title was vested in owners
who were not parties to the case. Attempts by Ms. Ninow to vote all 6000
shares have all been rejected by Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., no court
of competent jurisdiction over Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., has ever
ruled otherwise [See, inter aha, UCA 16-10a-724(6)], and William Lowe and
Augusta Rose continue to serve as its only officers and as a quorum of its
directors. Gary G. Pahl's heir owns 3000 shares (50%), subject to probate
claims and administration by the personal representative. As owners of less
than a majority of shares, neither the heir nor the personal representative can
unilaterally convene a shareholder quorum. They enjoy only those rights
enjoyed generally by shareholders of Utah corporations. They have no right
to deal in, receive, expend, possess, or dispose of any corporate assets, no
right to obligate the corporation, no right to conduct day-to-day corporate
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business or to engage in corporate operations, and no right to hold themselves
out as doing so, and are not officers, employees, or agents of the corporation.
Regardless of whether the proper standard of appellate review is now
applied to facts listed by Ms. Ninow in her summary judgment memorandum
in the trial court or to undisputed facts 1-12 now listed by Ms. Ninow on
Appeal [Appellee's Brief at 4-8], the summary judgment should be reversed.
Since Ms. Ninow, on appeal, has now set forth numbered undisputed
facts 1-12 [Appellee's Brief at 4-8] in order to "aid the court in understanding
all of the undisputed facts upon which the lower court based its summary
judgment in favor of Ninow" [Appellee's Brief at 8], a reply to those facts is
now provided in this reply brief. Paragraph 1 simply sets forth the fact that
the articles of incorporation of Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc. [which
was not a party to this proceeding], provide for 6000 shares of common
voting stock and that 3000 of the shares [50%] passedfromA. Gunther Pahl
to Gary G. Pahl. Paragraph 2 makes reference to the May 6, 1998, Bill of
Sale for the other 3000 shares [50%]fromFrank H. Pahl to Gary G. Pahl, and
establish that William Lowe held the 3000 sharesfromand after the execution
of the May 6,1998, Bill of Sale. Paragraphs 3 and 4 establish that all of the
conditions of the May 6,1998, Bill of Sale had been satisfied by April 17,
2000. When properly viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving
parties, it is reasonable to infer from these undisputed facts that William
Lowe conditionally held the 3000 sharesfromMay 6,1998, to April 17,
2000, pending completion of the terms of the May 6,1998, Bill of Sale, and
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that after April 17,2000, William Lowe held the shares as corporate treasurer
for and on behalf the corporation, which owned them as treasury shares. The
incorrect inference that they were held by Gary G. Pahl as part of his personal
estate is drawn by incorrectly viewing the undisputed facts and the reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the moving party.
Paragraph 5 contains facts pertaining to a September 25,2000, Bill of
Sale involving a transfer of an interest in buildings which is fully separate and
distinctfromthe transfer of 3000 shares of corporate stock. At the end of
Paragraph 5, Ms. Ninow has inserted a sentence that is not a fact properly
supported by accurate reference to the record, but is argument: "Therefore,
pursuant to the terms of the May 6,1998, Bill of Sale and its 'successful
completion', said three thousand shares belonged to Gary G. Pahl at the date
of his death." This argument fails to view all of the facts, and all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the non-moving
parties. The cited reference to the record establishes only that the obligations
under the May 6,1998, agreement were satisfied, but does not establish as an
undisputed fact that Gary G. Pahl made no agreements to transfer his interest
in the 3000 shares of stock. The use of the term "therefore" makes it clear
that it is a mere argument based on the preceding sentences. And it is mere
argument that does not advance the analysis or settle the question. All 6000
shares did belong to Gary, 3000 directly and 3000 treasury shares indirectly.
In order to set forth undisputed facts that support summary judgment,
Ms. Ninow would have had to include an additional [false] statement in her
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numbered statement of undisputed material facts that said substantially the
following: "Gary G. Pahl entered into no agreements that caused any transfer
of any of his interests in any shares of the corporation." Had Ms. Ninow
done this below, William Lowe and Augusta Rose would have placed such a
numbered "undisputed" fact in dispute by simply identifying it as disputed
with further references to the December 28,1998, Bill of Sale, pursuant to
which "upon successful completion" of the May 6,1998, agreement, the 3000
shares that were being conditionally held by William Lowe would "belong to
the treasury of the Corporation, leaving a balance of 3,000 common shares
outstanding" [R. 421] and the undisputed fact that "successful completion"
of the May 6,1998, agreement occurred on April 17, 2000, prior Jo death.
Paragraphs 5 through 9 are also not material. They establish that Frank
[not Gary] Pahl never personally or through an agent transferred, devised,
bequeathed, or assigned any of the 3000 shares to any person other than to
sell the said 3000 shares to Gary via the May 6,1998, Bill of Sale. All 6000
shares did belong to Gary, who directly owned 3000 shares and indirectly
owned 3000 treasury shares held by Mr. Lowe. Conspicuously absent is a
statement that Gary never personally or through an agent transferred, devised,
bequeathed, or assigned any of the 3000 shares. Since such a statement is
made as to Frank, but is conspicuously absent as to Gary, the absence of any
such transfer agreements by Gary is not deemed admitted under CJA 4-501.
Paragraph 9 merely sets forth the procedural course of proceedings.
Thus, the listed facts are not material and do not settle the question.
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Paragraphs 10-12 pertain to the TRO and interlocutory contempt order.
The conspicuous absence of the material facts needed to establish the
proposition Ms. Ninow seeks to estabhsh precludes summary judgment. She
cannot avoid addressing the transfer into the treasury, the subsequent actions
taken by the board to re-issue the treasury stock, and the URCP 70 judgment
entered by Judge Robert Hilder in an action against her [now consolidated
herewith] by simply failing to mention them. Nor can she ignore official
actions duly taken by the board of directors and by courts. She has taken the
same approach in her brief by simply ignoring this court's October 28,2003,
order and re-arguing her contention "that the October 1,2002 contempt order
is afinalorder and that Appellant Lowe did not timely appealfromthat
order" even though this court has already addressed and adjudicated her
argument, rejecting it: "However, consistent with the general rule, the civil
contempt order in this case is interlocutory. See Von Hake v. Thomas. 759 P.
2d 1162,1167 & n.3 (Utah 1988)." [Order of October 28,2003] Below she
not only simply ignored material facts not convenient to her position, but she
used an approach comparable to claiming this court's October 28,2003, order
can be ignored by claiming that the three Court of Appeals judges named in
the October 28, 2003, order are not authorized to sit on this court and then
attempting to "prove" this by listing each judge's penultimate employment
position or office but omitting the appointment to the Court of Appeals.
As of January 1987, The Honorable Russell W. Bench was no longer in
private practice, an assistant attorney general, or a central staff attorney for
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the Utah Supreme Court, but was a member of the Utah Court of Appeals.
As of January 1987, Judge Norman H. Jackson was no longer an
attorney in private practice, but was a member of the Utah Court of Appeals.
As of January 1987, Judge Gregory K. Orme was no longer an attorney
in private practice or a law clerk to Judge Monroe G. McKay, Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals, but was a member of the Utah Court of Appeals.
And as of April 17,2000, the 3000 shares held by William Lowe were
no longer held by him conditionally pending completion of the May 6,1998,
Bill of Sale, but were held by him as the treasurer and were treasury stock.
It was error for the trial court to enter a summary judgment on such an
incomplete listing of material facts just as it was error for the trial court to
hold William Lowe in contempt as part of its order of October 1,2002, for
action Mr. Lowe took in exercise of rights under, inter alia, UCA Sees. 1610a-901 through 909 after the TRO inadvertently expired. It was not the
responsibility of William Lowe or his counsel to get the TRO extended or to
alert the court or the other side it was about to expire or had expired. In the
case of William Lowe's counsel, alerting the court of the expiration by even
asking about it would have violated counsel's duty of loyalty to Mr. Lowe, as
such an inquiry would likely have triggered immediate entry of a new order.
Ms. Ninow's brief raises the default judgment entered on February 6,
2003, prior to the time she claimed her counsel had "inadvertently" failed to
include some key language in the earlier October 1,2002, order and belatedly
submitted her proposed supplemental summary judgment dated May 1,2003.
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She fails to point out that the main purpose of the February 6,2003,
default judgment was its permanent injunction enjoining Richard Ninow from
defaming Augusta Rose and fails to point out that there was nothing left for
the court to decide regarding defamation or the 3000 shares after it entered
the February 6,2003, judgment. However, having now asserted that the
February 6,2003, judgment was not a final order, but that the October 1,
2002, order wasfinal,she is estoppedfromasserting that the May 1,2003,
order was timely submitted within the three month limit set forth in URCP
60(b) in cases of "inadvertence" such as this, since she is estopped from
using February 6,2003, as the starting date for counting that three months.
After the February 6, 2003, order was entered, appellants timely
appealed the October 1,2002, interlocutory order. When the trial court
entered a May 1,2003, summary judgment without leave of the appellate
court based on the "inadvertence" of KaLynn Ninow's counsel in excluding
its languagefromearlier orders, appellants timely filed a second notice of
appeal that covered all prior orders in the trial court as a precaution. But
KaLynn Ninow is now estoppedfromusing a February 6, 2003, starting date.
KaLynn Ninow's brief fails to address the jurisdictional point raised on
page 50 of appellants' brief that by the time the new May 1,2003, summary
judgment was entered, Judge Robert Hilder, in a separate civil case against
KaLynn Ninow as the personal representative that has been consolidated with
this matter, in a default judgment that was still in place on May 1, 2003, had
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fully divested any title KaLynn Ninow had in the 3000 shares and vested it in
out-of-state owners pursuant to URCP 70. By the time the new May 1,2003,
summary judgment was entered, Judge Tyrone Medley had neither personal
jurisdiction over the owners of the 3000 shares to divest their title and vest it
in KaLynn Ninow nor in rem jurisdiction over the 3000 shares, which were
by then all out-of-state beyond his jurisdictional reach pursuant to URCP 70.
URCP 70 provides as follows:
Rule 70. Judgment for specific acts; vesting title.
If a judgment directs a party to execute a conveyance of land or to deliver
deeds or other documents or to perform any other specific act and the party
fails to comply within the time specified, the court may direct the act to be
done at the cost of the disobedient party by some other person appointed by
the court and the act when so done has like effect as if done by the party. On
application of the party entitled to performance and upon order of the court,
the clerk shall issue a writ of attachment or sequestration against the property
of the disobedient party to compel obedience to the judgment. The court may
also in proper cases adjudge the party in contempt. If real or personal
property is within the state, the court in lieu of directing a conveyance
thereof may enter a judgment divesting the title of any party and vesting it
in others and such judgment has the effect of a conveyance executed in
due form of law. When any order or judgment is for the delivery of
possession, the party in whose favor it is entered is entitled to a writ of
execution or assistance upon application to the clerk. [Emphasis added.]
The May 1, 2003, summary judgment is, thus, null and of no effect. It
should here be noted that in regards to the nullity of the May 1, 2003, order,
as with the various other legal points raised herein, it is not necessary for the
Court of Appeals to exhaustively analyze these points with a consideration of
all applicable statutes and precedents and then enter a definitive holding. It is
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only necessary to conclude these legal points are "colorable" enough to be
argued in the light most favorable to appellants when questions of application
of law to fact are viewed in that most favorable light and reverse the May 1,
2003, order and the summary judgment parts of the October 1,2002, order.
POINT THREE
The November 26,2002, URCP 70 judgment should be affirmed
and the June 12,2003, order setting it aside should now be reversed.
As set forth in Point Two above, the timely response to the motion for
summary judgment filed by Lowe and Rose notified Judge Medley that he
lacked personal jurisdiction over Diamond Fork Land Company and in rem
jurisdiction over the 1500 shares it then owned. He later lacked jurisdiction
on May 1, 2003, to enter the summary judgment as to any of the 3000 shares
because, on November 26,2002, Judge Hilder had already entered a default
judgment against KaLynn Ninow divesting her title, if any, to the 3000 shares,
and that judgment was still in effect on May 1, 2003, as it was not set aside
by Judge Hilder until June 12, 2003. Over the objections of William Lowe
and Augusta Rose, as well as over the objections of Pahl's Salt Palace Loan
Office, Inc., [R. 1342-1371] which was not a party to this proceeding, but
made a "special appearance" below for the purpose of objecting, an April 15,
2004, order consohdated Judge Hilder's case with this probate. Even though
title is still vested in the out-of-state shareowners, this court should now bring
finality and clarity by reversing the June 12, 2003, order. [R. 1321] KaLynn
Ninow was tardy and did not respond to the summons until the day default
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was entered. During the days following her tardy response, she failed to
exercise any diligence in determining whether a default judgment had been
entered and failed to file for URCP 60(b)(1) relief within the required three
months. Judge Hilder correctly ruled he had no discretion to grant relief in
this "mistake" case since the three-month deadline was not met. [R. 1321]
Judge Hilder then reversed himself and granted relief under Oseeuera
v. Farmers Insurance Exchange. 2003 Ut App 46,68 R3d 1008, which was
plain error because that case provides relief only to tardy parties who, unlike
KaLynn Ninow, diligently seek to ascertain if a judgment is entered and are
somehow misled. Judge Hilder made no suchfindingas to KaLynn Ninow.
POINT FOUR
The TRO inadvertently expired at the date and time in the TRO.
Turning now to the contempt order, appellee's brief claims that the case
of SEC (Levine) v. Comcoa Ltd. 70 F.3rd 1191 (I lth Cir. 1995) stands for the
proposition that continuing the hearing into the second day constituted a forcause extension of the initial 10 day period without the consent of Lowe.
No such holding appears in that case. Footnote 6fromthat case on
which Ms. Ninow relies does not state extension occurred without consent.
Indeed, in SEC v. Comcoa Ltd. 887 F. Supp 1521 (S.D. Fla 1995), the
district court held that this was a "consent" case, reasoning that the failure to
object to the court's declaration that the temporary restraining order would
remain in effect until the court rendered decisions on outstanding motions
constituted consent to the extension. Significantly, Moore's Federal Practice
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3rd Sec. 65.38 analyzes the Comcoa Ltd. case as a "consent" case. The trial
court proceedings in Comcoa Ltd. were materially different from proceedings
in the trial court in this case. In Comcoa Ltd.. the trial court entered an oral
extension of the TRO in open court, which was violated after it was entered,
while, in the case at bar, there was no such express extension of the TRO,
oral or otherwise, prior to the time $7500 was transferred, and, thus, there
was no implied "consent" here. In the Comcoa Ltd. case, as in the case at
bar, "(t)he problem arose . . . because the party who petitioned for and
obtained the TRO stood silent while the order inadvertently expired without
counseling the court of the requirements for its extension." [Comcoa Ltd.. 70
F.3rd 1191,1194, concurring opinion.] While the Comcoa Ltd. case does not
apply here, the holding in SEC v. Unifund Sal 910 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1990)
does apply. As in this case, the preliminary injunction hearing in Unrfund Sal
commenced prior to the expiration of the TRO and the TRO inadvertently
expired. After it expired, the trial court in Unifund Sal entered an untimely
order extending the TRO. But unlike the restrained party in Comcoa Ltd., the
restrained party in Unifund Sal objected, which vitiated implied consent. On
appeal, the court held that the order purporting to extend the TRO in Unifund
Sal was invalid since it was not timely entered within the ten day period of
the TRO. The holding in Unifund Sal should be adopted in this case and the
October 1, 2002, order reversed. Contempt requires an actual order with an
unequivocal mandate, settled doctrine in law that is well expressed in a recent
case involving the New York attorney general: "To sustain a civil contempt, a
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lawful judicial order expressing an unequivocal mandate must have been in
effect and disobeyed." Ulster Home Care. Inc.. v. Dennis C. Vacco. as
Attorney General of New York. 688 N.Y.S.2d 830 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999).
The United States Supreme Court has held parties are entitled to "fair
and precise notice of what the injunction actually prohibits" and mat "(i)t
would be inconsistent with this basic principle to countenance procedures
whereby parties against whom an injunction is directed are left to guess
about its intended duration. Rule 65(b) provides that temporary restraining
orders expire by their own terms within 10 days of their issuance. Where a
court intends to supplant such an order ...it should issue an order clearly
saying so. And where it has not done so, a party against whom a
temporary restraining order has issued may reasonably assume that the
order has expired within the time limits imposed by Rule 65(b).'" Granny
Goose Foods. Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers. Local
No. 70. 415 U.S. 423, 444-45; 94 S.Ct. 1113, 1126-27. [Emphasis added.]
Contrary to Ms. Ninow's claim there was no harm, there was harm to
William Lowe, who was forced to pay $7,500.00 to Ms. Ninow [instead of
paying it back to the corporation], plus $5,650.00 in attorney fees, and who
was deprived of his right to the $7,500.00 under, inter alia, UCA Sees. 1610a-901 through 909 by incorrect use by the court of its contempt powers.
With all due respect to Ms. Ninow's stern warning to this court that
reversing the contempt order will somehow invite "judicial chaos", our rules
are very adequatelyframedto prevent such consequences, since a judge can
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extend the TRO by timely doing so and entering the reasons in the record,
"effectuating a fluid, uninterrupted" procedure that does not create any
"judicial chaos" but helps avoid the "judicial chaos" arising when "parties
against whom an injunction is directed are left to guess about its intended
duration." In Ms. Ninow's hypothetical building demolition story, a "party
who petitioned for and obtained the TRO" would not likely have "stood silent
while the order inadvertently expired without counseling the court of the
requirements for its extension" like Ms. Ninow's counsel stood silent here.
POINT FIVE
Accusing one's adversary of factual "distortion, mischaracterization, and
exaggeration" [Brief of Appellee, Part C ] does not settle the question.
Ms. Ninow claims appellants have distorted, mischaracterized, and
exaggerated facts. She then attempts to show this with four paragraphs that
improperly state facts and draw inferences in the light that is most favorable
to herself. It is not the office of a summary judgment [but it is for a jury] to
decide which side is distorting, mischaracterizing, or exaggerating the facts.
CONCLUSION
In addition to all of the relief sought in the opening brief, the July 12,
2003, order should be reversed ancrrae November/^, 2002, order affirmed.
DATED TfflS

DAW OF JUNE, 2004.

~

ROBERT HEWRY C0PIER,
Attorney tor iiowand Rose
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True copies hereof were mailed to:
Daniel F. Van Woerkom
Sandra K. Weeks
Van Woerkom & Weeks
2975 West Executive Parkway #414
LehiUT84(P
on this, the
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of JUne, 2004

C0PI{
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(d Augusta Rose

ADDENDA
A-1 - Court of Appeals Order of October 28,2003.
A-2 - June 3,2002, transfer notice with provenances.
A-3 - Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
entered on October 1,2002; Interlocutory
order of contempt entered on October 1,2002;
Final judgment entered on February 6,2003;
timely filed February 20,2003, Notice of
Appeal; Reply to Objection to Proposed
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order Granting Summary Judgment filed by
KaLynn Ninow on April 16,2003, prior
to entry of May 1,2003 order [stating that
May 1,2003, order was being sought because
her counsel had "inadvertently" failed to
include some language in the earlier order
that had been appealed February 20,2003];
timely filed May 23,2003, Notice of Appeal.
A-4 June 1,2002, shareholder derivative demand;
November 26,2002, Default Judgment entered
by Judge Hilder in the derivative action case;
June 12,2003, ruling and order by Judge Hilder
setting aside the default judgment; printout of
docket in the shareholder derivative action case.
A-5 June 9,2004, letter to Judge Medley.

A-1
Court of Appeals Order of October 28,2003.

FILED
Utah Court of Appeals

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

OCT 2 8 2003

ooOoo

Paillette Stagg
Cleric of the Court

In the matter of the estate of
Gary G. Pahl, deceased.

ORDER
Case No. 20030169-CA

Kaylinn Ninow,
Petitioner and Appellee,
v.
Grand Staircase Land Co., a Utah
corporation, William Lowe,
Augusta Rose, and Robert
Mortensen,
Respondents and Appellants.

Augusta Rose,
Third-Party Petitioner,
v.
Ryan Pahl, Kaylinn Ninow,
Richard Ninow, and Does I-V,
Third-Party Respondents.

Before Judges Jackson, tsench, and
This matter is before the court on Appellee's Motion to
Dismiss Appeal, Motion for Summary Disposition, Motion to Dismiss
Unframed Issues and Improper Parties, and Appellants'1
suggestions of mootness and request to defer decision on
Appelleefs motions.2
1. Robert Mortensen was dismissed from the probate proceedings
and is not a party to this appeal.
2.

Appellants filed a Motion for Summary Disposition, seeking
(continued...)

Appellee contends that
a final order and Appellant
order. However, consistent
contempt order in this case
Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 1167

the October 1, 2002 contempt order is
Lowe did not timely appeal from that
with the general rule, the civil
is interlocutory. See Von Hake v.
& n.3 (Utah 1988).

Appellee also contends that the first notice of appeal was
not filed from a final, appealable order because the district
court has not ruled on the ownership of the real property.
Appellants have filed suggestions of partial mootness but
have not moved to dismiss any part of their appeal. Rather, they
request this court to defer decision on Appellee's motions
pending resolution of a motion to set aside a default judgment in
a collateral action.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellants' request to defer
decision is denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Appelleefs motion to dismiss
Appellants1 appeal, including Appellant Lowe's appeal of the
interlocutory contempt order, is denied, and a ruling as to
whether Appellants' appeal is taken from a final, appealable
order is deferred pending plenary presentation and consideration
of the appeal.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in addition to briefing the
merits, the parties shall also brief the issue of whether the
appeal is taken from a final, appealable order. See In re Estate
of Vorhees, 12 Utah 2d 361, 366 P.2d 977, 980 (1961).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Appellee's Motion to Dismiss
Unframed Issues and Improper Parties is denied.
The parties will be notified when a briefing schedule has
been established.
Dated this ^p/0

day of October 2003.

FOR THE COURT:

Norman H. Jackson,
Presiding Judge

2. (. ..continued)
summary reversal. However, Appellants have withdrawn the motion.
2

A-2
June 3,2002, transfer notice with provenances.

FILED DISTRICT COOFtT
ROBERT H. COPIER, 727
Attorney for William Lowe and
Grand Staircase Land Company
243 East 400 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City UT 84111-2803
Telephone (801) 531-7923

Third Judicial District

JUN G h 2(102
SALT LAKE COL NTY
By.

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SCOTT M. MATHESON COURTHOUSE
PROBATE DIVISION

In the matter of the

STOCK TRANSFER NOTICE
AND REQUEST FOR NOTICE

ESTATE OF GARY G. PAHL,
Deceased.

/**
Deputy Clerk

Probate No. 003901101
Judge Tyrone E. Medley

Grand Staircase Land Company, a Utah Corporation, requests notice of
hearings and proceedings in this probate. Grand Staircase Land Company has
acquired stock in Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., ("the corporation"). This
court has entered a preliminary injunction that temporarily enjoins the officers and
directors of the corporation from performing duties. The personal representative
herein claims to have caused filing(s) to be made with the State of Utah Division of
Corporations setting forth the names of certain persons as purported new officers,
directors, and agents of the corporation. Since there was no vote by a quorum of
shareholders to elect and qualify any new directors, and there has yet to be an
adjudication on the merits of the personal representative's petition to adjudicate
share ownership, said filing(s) were premature and invalid. Acceptance of filings
by the State of Utah Division of Corporations creates no presumption of validity.

The following appear to be the shareholders of stock in the corporation:
KaLynn Ninon

3000 shares

Grand Staircase Land Company

1500 shares

William Lowe (escrow for Grand Staircase Land Company)

1500 shares

SHARES AUTHORIZED, ISSUED, AND OUTSTANDING

6006 shares

The 3000 shares owned directly by and/or now held in escrow for Grand
Staircase Land Company were acquiredfromRobert K. Mortensen and Augusta
Rose on June 13 2002. Provenances of sharesfromthem are annexed to this filing.
The requested notices are to/6e senAo the undersigned attorney.
DATED THIS 3RD D A / O F JUNE,|2002.

.ROBERT m£QPI
M3~E^siWwjSouifi, Suite 200
Salt Lakd C/tytfr 84111-2803
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The copy of the foregoing was this-day MAILED AND FAXED to:
David C. Condie
Attorney for the Personal Representative
39 Exchange Place, Suite 101
Salt Lake City UT 8
FAX NO. 801-36
DATED THIS 3RD DA

PROVENANCE
L Transfer from Frank H. Paul to William T. Lowe, May 6,1998.
2. Transfer from William T. Lowe1 to Robert K Mortensen, September 2, 2000.

1

Between May 6, 1998, and August 25, 2000, William T. Lowe owed certain duties to
others in connection with the shares he owned. These duties changed with time based on
actions taken by persons authorized to take them. He initially owed certain duties to
Gary G. Pahl and Frank H. Paul. Prior to the death of Gary G. Pahl, and due to actions
taken by persons authorized to take them, he then owed certain duties only to Pahl's Salt
Palace Loan Office, Inc., and Frank H. Paul. In another later change in duties (prior to
the death of Gary G. Pahl) based on the fulfillment of certain conditions, he then owed
certain duties to Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., only. This status continued while
Gary G. Pahl was alive, and then after his death, until August 25, 2000. On August 25,
2000, based on an action taken by persons authorized to take it, he was released from the
duties he owed to Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., and was then free to convey, sell,
or gift these shares, in his sole discretion, as he saw fit, which he did September 2, 2000.

PROVENANCE
1. Transfer from Frank H. Paul to William T. Lowe, May 6,1998.
2. Transfer from William T. Lowe1 to Augusta Rose, September 2,2000.

1

Between May 6, 1998, and August 25,2000, William T. Lowe owed certain duties to
others in connection with the shares he owned. These duties changed with time based on
actions taken by persons authorized to take them. He initially owed certain duties to
Gary G. Pahl and Frank H. Paul. Prior to the death of Gary G. Pahl, and due to actions
taken by persons authorized to take them, he then owed certain duties only to PahTs Salt
Palace Loan Office, Inc., and Frank H. Paul. In another later change in duties (prior to
the death of Gary G. Pahl) based on the fulfillment of certain conditions, he then owed
certain duties to Pahlfs Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., only. This status continued while
Gary G. Pahl was alive, and then after his death, until August 25,2000. On August 25,
2000, based on an action taken by persons authorized to take it, he was released from the
duties he owed to Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., and was then free to convey, sell,
or gift these shares, in his sole discretion, as he saw fit, which he did September 2,2000.

A-3
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
entered on October 1,2002; Interlocutory
order of contempt entered on October 1,2002;
Final judgment entered on February 6,2003;
timely filed February 20,2003, Notice of
Appeal; Reply to Objection to Proposed
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order Granting Summary Judgment filed by
KaLynn Ninow on April 16,2003, prior
to entry of May 1,2003 order [stating that
May 1,2003, order was being sought because
her counsel had "inadvertently" failed to
include some language in the earlier order
that had been appealed February 20,2003];
timely filed May 23,2003, Notice of Appeal.

Daniel F. Van Woerkom USB #8500
David Condie USB #8053
VAN WOERKOM & CONDIE, LC
32 Exchange Place, Suite 101
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-6195
Facsimile: (801) 363-4850
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF
GARY G. PAHL
Deceased.

FINDINGS OF FACT
AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Civil No. 003901101
Judge Medley

This matter came before the Court at a hearing on September 5, 2002, based upon the
motion filed by KaLynn Ninow, in her capacity as the personal representative of the Estate of
Gary G. Pahl, and in her capacity as the court appointed Guardian and Conservator for Ryan B.
Pahl, the only heir(devisee) of Gary G. Pahl, and subsequent Order to Show Cause issued June 4,
2002, requiring William T. Lowe to appear and show cause why he should not be held in
contempt of court for violation of the Court's previous orders. Several motions and supporting
memoranda were filed by Mr. Lowe directly related to the Order to Show Cause, namely:
Motion (and Memorandum in Support) to Strike Affidavit, Dismiss Contempt Proceeding and
Vacate Order to Show Cause; a Motion (and Memorandum in Support) for Summary Judgment
regarding contempt; a Consolidated Reply Memorandum regarding Mr. Lowe's motions

pertaining to contempt; Affidavits of William T. Lowe and Augusta Rose; Response to Order to
Show Cause; Bench Brief re: Contempt, and a supplemental Affidavit of William T. Lowe. The
motions filed by Mr. Lowe were opposed by KaLynn Ninow.
The Court, following oral argument on the parties competing motions for summary
judgment on August 26, 2002, ultimately denied the motions to strike, dismiss and vacate the
contempt proceedings, as well as the motion for summary judgment regarding contempt. In
connection with the foregoing motions, the Court ruled that KaLynn Ninow had established a
prima facie showing of contempt sufficient to support a motion and Order to Show Cause
hearing. The Order to Show Cause hearing was scheduled for September 5v 2002.
The Court convened the hearing on the Order to Show Cause as scheduled. Appearing at
the hearing were: KaLynn Ninow, represented by and through counsel, David C. Condie;
William T. Lowe, represented by and through counsel, Robert Copier. The Court, after having
heard the testimony of witnesses and arguments of both counsel, and^ after considering the
evidence and also taking time to review the applicable cases cited distinguishing, civil and
criminal contempt, makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Based upon the evidence that has been presented, this Court is satisfied that the
evidence is clear and convincing, and is undisputed, that William T. Lowe had
knowledge of the Temporary Restraining Order ("TRO") issued by the Court on
May 20,2002, and that he also had knowledge of what was required of him under
the provisions of the TRO.

2.

The Court finds that the evidence is clear and convincing, and is undisputed, that
William T. Lowe Based had the ability to comply with the terms of the TRO.

3.

The Court finds that the evidence is clear and convincing that Mr. Lowe
knowlingly and intentionally failed to comply or refused to comply with the TRO,
when he immediately left the courtroom on May 30, 2002, and within
approximately 12 minutes arrived at the Utah Central Credit Union, accompanied
by his legal counsel, removed $7,500.00 from the Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office
Building Account, immediately obtained a cashier's check payable to Robert
Copier for $7,500.00 and delivered said check to Mr. Copier to cover Mr. Lowe's
personal legal expenses.

4.

In making the above Findings pertaining to Mr. Lowe's intentional failure to
comply with the TRO, the Court further finds as follows:
a.

Mr. Lowe is a sophisticated party in terms of his level of education and his
experience with the court system, albeit that experience was connected
with small claims, juvenile and domestic relations cases. Mr. Lowe
testified that he had a graduate certificate in mediation training from the
University of Utah, and had participated in a number of legal proceedings.
Mr. Lowe also testified that he had personally reviewed the provisions of
the TRO, and that he had read Rule 65A of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. The Court finds that Mr. Lowe undertook a level of personal
action which is not common to parties in similar proceedings.

b.

The Court finds that the provisions of the TRO were clear and that they
were understood by Mr. Lowe. The TRO placed Mr. Lowe under Court
order to appear and show cause why the provisions of the TRO should not
continue in the form of a preliminary injunction.

c.

The Court finds that the hearing on the TRO began on May 30, 2002 at
approximately 10:00 a.m., for the express purpose to determine whether or
not the provisions of the TRO would be continued in the form of a
Prelminary Injunction.

d.

The hearing on the TRO/Motion for Preliminary Injunction commenced
prior to the time of expiration stated on the TRO.

e.

The Court took a recess for lunch at approximately 12:00 p.m. on May 30,
2002, with the express direction to the parties that the court would
reconvene at 1:30 p.m. for the express purpose of continuing the hearing
to determine whether or not the provisions of the TRO would be continued
in the form of a Prelminary Injunction.

f.

Consistent with the Court's previous rulings announced on August 26,
2002, based upon the facts and circumstances of the case, the TRO was
extended for good cause beyond the lunch break.

g.

The evidence is clear and convincing, and is undisputed, that Mr. Lowe
did in fact remove the $7,500.00 from the account at the Utah Central
Credit Union approximately 12 minutes following the Court's noon recess.

The Court finds that the removal of said funds was the nature and type of
conduct expressly prohibited by the provisions of the TRO.
The Court finds that if any other interpretation were to apply regarding the
status of the TRO, returning in the afternoon would have been a futility
and a frustration of the express purposes for which the Court had
convened.
The Court finds that the continuance and reconvening of the hearing
following the noon recess was sufficient to place a reasonable person on
notice and impute knowledge that the TRO was still in place pending the
resolution of the hearing thereon.
The Court finds that Mr. Lowe's testimony regarding his subjective
reasoning, interpretation and ultimate position that the TRO had expired,
lacks credibility and is not ^treasonable under the circumstances. The
Court finds this to be especially true in light of the fact that Lowe failed to
seek any clarification as to whether the TRO remained in place.
The Court finds that this specific failure to seek any clarification further
bears on the credibility of Mr. Lowe's overall testimony, which
[credibility] is lacking greatly.
Considering all of the facts presented and the circumstances of this case,
Mr. Lowe's subjective belief concerning the TRO was not reasonable.
The Court is satisfied that the conduct of Mr. Lowe during the noon recess

on May 30, 2002 was intentional, and that he deliberately sought to satisfy
his personal needs in direct contravention of the TRO which was in place
by removing money from the account in question and paying his personal
attorneys' fees
5.

Based upon the evidence and the testimony presented, the Court finds William T.
Lowe to be in contempt of this Court's prior rulings pertaining to the TRO.

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing Findings of Ejact, this Court enters its:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Mr. Lowe stands in contempt of Court for his actions undertaken during the noon
recess of the hearing conducted on May 30, 2002.

2.

The Personal Representative is entitled to relief in ljght of the contempt
committed by Mr. Lowe.

3.

The Personal Representative is entitled to the immediate return of the $7,500.00
taken by Mr. Lowe from the banking account in question, and is also entitled to
reasonable attorneys fees and costs related to her efforts in litigating, the contempt
issues in this case.

4.

As a result of his contempt and the resulting damage to the Personal
Representative, and in order to secure payment of the amounts indicated in the
preceding paragraph, it is appropriate that Mr. Lowe be ordered to serve 30 days
in the Salt Lake County Jail if he does not pay the amounts ordered within the
time to be specified by the Court.

5.

The Court concludes that as a matter of law, that at any time during his service of
the 30 day jail sentence, Mr. Lowe will be allowed to purge himself of contempt
by paying in full the $7,500.00 improperly removed from the account in question
and paying such sums for attorneys' fees as shall be approved and awarded by the
Court.

ENTERED this

day of September, 2002.

& I 02-*

Approved as to form:

Robert H. Copier
Attorney for William T. Lowe
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Daniel F. Van Woerkom USB #8500
David Condie USB #8053
VAN WOERKOM & CONDIE, LC
32 Exchange Place, Suite 101
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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Telephone: (801) 531-6195
Facsimile: (801) 363-4850

ENTERED IN REGISTRY
u rF J U I V C I
^ / ^ ' °/
° JUDGMENTS
DATE
10 / t)'* /P -f

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF
GARY G. PAHL

ORDER

Deceased.
Civil No. 003901101
Judge Medley

This matter came before the Court at a hearing on September 5, 2002, based upon the
motion filed by KaLynn Ninow, in her capacity as the personal representative of the Estate of
Gary G. Pahl, and in her capacity as the court appointed Guardian and Conservator for Ryan B.
Pahl, the only heir (devisee) of Gary G. Pahl, and subsequent Order to rShow Cause issued June
4, 2002, requiring William T. Lowe to appear and show cause why he should not be held in
contempt of court for violation of the Court's previous orders. Several motions-and supporting
memoranda were filed by Mr. Lowe directly related to the Order to Show Caiuse, namely:
Motion (and Memorandum in Support) to Strike Affidavit, Dismiss Contempt Proceeding and
Vacate Order to Show Cause; a Motion (and Memorandum in Support) for Summary Judgment
regarding contempt; a Consolidated Reply Memorandum regarding Mr. Lowe's motions
pertaining to contempt; Affidavits of William T. Lowe and Augusta Rose; Response to Order to

Show Cause; Bench Brief re: Contempt, and a supplemental Affidavit of William T. Lowe. The
motions filed by Mr. Lowe were opposed by KaLynn Ninow.
The Court, following oral argument on the parties competing motions for summary
judgment on August 26, 2002, ultimately denied the motions to strike, dismiss and vacate the
contempt proceedings, as well as the motion for summary judgment regarding contempt. In
connection with the foregoing motions, the Court ruled that KaLynn Ninow had established a
prima facie showing of contempt sufficient to support a motion and Order to Show Cause
hearing. The Order to Show Cause hearing was scheduled for September 5,2002.
The Court convened the hearing on the Order to Show Cause as scheduled. Appearing at
the hearing were: KaLynn Ninow, represented by and through counsel, David C. Condie;
William T. Lowe, represented by and through counsel, Robert Copier. The Court, after having
heard the testimony of witnesses and arguments of both counsel, and after considering the
evidence and also taking time to review the applicable cases cited distinguishing civil and
criminal contempt, having entered FINDINGS OF FACT and CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
hereby ORDERS AS FOLLOWS:

1.

Mr. Lowe stands in contempt of Court for his knowing and intentional failure to
adhere to the provisions of the TRO as demonstrated by his actions undertaken
during the noon recess of the hearing conducted on May 30,2002.

2.

The Personal Representative is entitled to relief in light of the contempt
committed by Mr. Lowe.

3.

Mr. Lowe is ordered to return the $7,500.00 taken from the Salt Palace Loan
Office Building Account to the Personal Representative.

4.

Mr. Lowe is ordered to pay the Personal Representative her reasonable attorneys
fees relatedU- to
this
case in the
WJ her
11V1 efforts
W U U l l O in
H I litigating
l l . l l g C H . l I l g > the
HIV/ contempt
V V / H C V l l i p t issues
l O O U V O in
111 V
JL
amount of DILQ O U ^

5.

- . X,. _ „
^ dollars
_ and no cents.A-1,

Funds tendered to the Personal Representative for payment of amounts spewed
in paragraphs three and four shall be in the form of certified check, or guaranteed
funds.

6.

Mr. Lowe shall have ten business days from the date of entry of this order to pay
the aforementioned amounts in full. If said amounts are not paid in Ml, then it is
ordered that an immediate warrant shall issue without further notice, and Mr.
Lowe shall be confined to the Salt Lake County Jail for a period of thirty (30)
days or until such time as he purges himself of contempt by payment of the
amounts specified in paragraphs three and four of this order in full.

7.

Any amounts remaining unpaid following the completion of any time served in
the Salt Lake County Jail shall constitute a judgment due and^)wing against Mr.
Lowe in favor of the Personal Representative.

8.

A review hearing is scheduled for September 25, 2002 at 2:00 p.m. in order to
determine whether or not Mr. Lowe has complied with the foregoing, order.

SO ORDERED, this

day of September, 2002

o0**\ «l<* I
Approved as to form

Robert H Copier
Attorney for William T Lowe
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IMAGED
ROBERT HENRY COPIER, 727
Attorney for Respondents
Grand Staircase Land Company,
William Lowe, and Augusta Rose
243 East University Boulevard - 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2803
Telephone 531-7923
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Deputy Cierk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SCOTT M. MATHESON COURTHOUSE - PROBATE DIVISION

In the matter of the estate of

DEFAULT JUDGMENT

GARYG.PAHL,
Deceased.

Probate No. 003901101
Judge Tyrone E. Medley

KALYNN NINOW,
Petitioner,
vs.
GRAND STAIRCASE LAND COMPANY,
a Utah corporation, WILLIAM LOWE,
AUGUSTA ROSE, and ROBERT MORTENSEN,
Respondents,
vs.
RYAN PAHL, KALYNN NINOW,
•

RICHARD NINOW,

and DOES I-V,
Third Party respondents.

The default of Richard Ninow having been entered for failure to appear,
to plead, or to otherwise respond after being served with the Amended Counter

JD

Petition, Third Party Petition, and Demand for Jury Trial by Augusta Rose, and a
Motion for Default Judgment having been filed and submitted for court decision
with a supporting memorandum, the court, being sufficiently advised, finds that
Richard Ninow is violating or has violated the provisions of Part 9 of Title 76 of
the Utah Code, and does now hereby permanently enjoin Richard Ninow from a
continuance thereof. Judgment in the sum of $766.00 is entered pursuant to UCA
Sec. 76-9-406 against Richard Ninow in favor of Augusta Rose for her costs and
reasonable attorney's fees, as was established by the fee and cost affidavit of her
counsel dated and filed October 24, 2002.
DATED THIS

DAY OF JANUARY, 2003

FILEB 0ISTBICT eOUfiT
Third Judicial District

ROBERT HENRY COPIER, 727
Attorney for Respondents
Grand Staircase Land Company,
William Lowe, and Augusta Rose
243 East University Boulevard - 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2803
Telephone 531-7923

F£e

2 0 2003

SAU LAKE CQu

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SCOTT M. MATHESON COURTHOUSE - PROBATE DIVISION
In the matter of the estate of

NOTICE OF APPEAL

GARY G. PAHL,
Deceased.

Probate No. 003901101
Judge Tyrone E. Medley

KALYNNNINOW,
Petitioner,
vs.
GRAND STAIRCASE LAND COMPANY,
a Utah corporation, WILLIAM LOWE,
AUGUSTA ROSE, and ROBERT MORTENSEN,
Respondents,
vs.
RYAN PAHL, KAL YNN NINOW,
RICHARD NINOW, and DOES I-V,
Third Party respondents.

Final judgment having been entered on February 7,2003, Grand Staircase
Land Company, William Lowe, and Augusta Rose appeal all prior rulings, orders,
and judgments herein from the Third District Court to the Utah Supreme Court.

DATED THIS 20'

fents Grand Staircase
/, William Lowe, and Augusta Rose

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
A copy hereof was this-day mailed to.
David C. Condie
Van Woerkom & Condie
Attornevsua| Law
32 ExgfiSngAPlace, Suite 101
Salt£ake Citiy UT 84111
DATED this 20m day of February, 2003

David Condie, P.C. (USB #8053)
32 Exchange Place, Suite 101
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-6195
Facsimile: (801) 363-4850
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF
GARYG.PAHL
Deceased.

REPLY TO OBJECTION TO
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Civil No. 003901101
Judge Medley

This matter came before the Court at a hearing on August 26, 2002, wherein the Court
granted summary judgment and expressly adopted the Statement of Facts as set forth in the
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment.
Counsel for KaLynn Ninow, Ryan Pahl and Richard Ninow inadvertently failed to submit
the proposed findings and order which he drafted to the court and did not realize the oversight
until recently. This delay does not affect the validity nor the granting of the summary judgment,
nor the rulings made by the Court from the bench on August 26, 2002, despite the fact that they
were not reduced to written form.
During the course of the hearing, Judge Medley adopted the Statement of Facts as set
forth therein, and granted the summary judgment as prayed for, and made further findings

consistent with the argument and analysis set forth in the moving memorandum in support of the
motion for summary judgment.

Counsel for the Ninows and Ryan Pahl has reviewed the

videocassette tape of the hearing and has done his best to draft findings of fact, conclusions of
law and an order consistent with the pronouncements made from the bench.
Mr. Copier's objection does not even attempt to attack any of the specific findings, nor
offer any proposed order of his own. His objections to form and content should therefore be
overruled and the proposed findings and order entered, subject obviously to review and additions
by the court as it deems appropriate.
Mr. Copier has not appealed the summary judgment. He has appealed the order finding
his client William Lowe in contempt. Additionally, Mr. Copier seems to believe that his
unilateral withdrawal of his un-adjudicated motions is the equivalent of a final and appealable
order. A motion has been filed to dismiss his appeal altogether. Regardless of the status of the
appeal, there is nothing which prevents, this Court from reducing the order granting summary
judgment to written form.
Accordingly, the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Granting
Summary Judgment should be entered.
DATED, this t h e / ^ day of April, 2003.

ROBERT H COPIER, 727
Attorney for Respondents
Grand Staircase Land Company,
William Lowe, and Augusta Rose
243 East 400 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City UT 84111-2803
Telephone (801) 531-7923
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SCOTT M. MATHESON COURTHOUSE
PROBATE DIVISION
In the matter of the estate of

if

¥

,0fr

GARY G. PAHL,

Probate No. 003901101

Deceased.
KALYNNNINOW,
Petitioner,

NOTICE OF APPEAL

vs.
GRAND STAIRCASE LAND
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,
WILLIAM LOWE, AUGUSTA
ROSE and ROBERT MORTENSEN,
Respondents.
vs.
RYAN PAHL, KALYNN NINOW,
RICHARD NINOW, and DOES I -V,
Third-party respondents.

Judge Tyrone E. Medley

iputy Clerk
QBSL

Respondents Grand Staircase Land Company, William Lowe, and Augusta
Rose hereby appeal, as a matter of right, from the Third District Court to the Utah
Supreme Court, the court's signed minute entry order of May 1, 2003, ["the Order
of the court resolving the matter"], together with all of the other orders, findings,
and conclusions entered herein on May 1, 2003, together with all the prior orders,
judgments, and rulings entered in this matter that were adverse to the positions)
taken by one or more of these respondents, including, but not limited to, the
Temporary Restraining Order entered May 20, 2002, the Order Granting
Preliminary Injunction entered August 26, 2002, the Order of September 25,
2002, and the Order of October 1,2002, together with all of the related findings
of fact, conclusions of law, and rulings made and entered h support thereof.
DATED THIS 23RD DAY OF MAY, 2003.

ROBERT HENRM COPIER
Attorney for theJSfespory^ent?
[andS^ij^ase i/and Company
WilTliamL^iwe^nd Augusta Rose
MAILING CERTIFICATE
A true copy of the foregoing was this-day mailed to:
David C. Condie
Attorney at Law
32 Exchang^Iak, Suite 101
Salt Lake City UT 84111
(Via Firstlciass ins. Mail)
DATED THIS 23RD DAY OF MAY, 2003.

A-4
June 1,2002, shareholder derivative demand;
November 26,2002, Default Judgment entered
by Judge Hilder in the derivative action case;
June 12,2003, ruling and order by Judge Hilder
setting aside the default judgment; printout of
docket in the shareholder derivative action case.

LAW OFFICES

ROBERT COPIER
ATTORNEY & CPA
ADVOCAAT COPIER P.C.
SALT LAKE CITY OFFICE
SALT LAKE CITY OFFICE ADDRESS
200 METRO PLACE
243 EAST 400 SOUTH, SUITE 200
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111-2803

SALT LAKE CITY PHONE NUMBERS:
OFFICE TELEPHONE (801) 631-7923
FAX LINE NUMBER (801) 531-7928
24-HOUR VOICE MAIL (801) 272-2222

June 1, 2002
PahTs Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc.
1588 South State Street
Salt Lake City UT 84115
Re: Shareholder Notice and Demand
To whom it may concern:
You are hereby notified to update the shareholder records of the corporation to reflect
transfer on June 1, 2002, of 1500 shares from Augusta Rose to Grand Staircase Land
Company, 243 East 400 South, Suite 200, SLC UT 84111, and of 1500 shares from
Robert K. Mortensen to Grand Staircase Land Company, 243 East 400 South, Suite 200
SLC UT 84111, with the latter 1500 shares being held in escrow by William Lowe, 3939
Alberly Way SLC UT 84124, for Grand Staircase Land Company. The beneficial owner
of the 1500 shares held in escrow by William Lowe for Grand Staircase Land Company is
Diamond Fork Land Company, 243 East 400 South, Suite 200, SLC UT 84111. Both
new shareholders demand that you act to vindicate your rights as to claims by KaLynn
Ninow, the personal representative of the estate of Gary G. Pahl, that she owns 3000
shares that were held by William Lowe and as to which Gary G. Pahl transferred all his
right, title, and interest to the corporation's treasury before he died, trespass by KaLynn
Ninow, Ryan Pahl, Richard Ninow, and others upon the corporation's property, the
conversion of its property to their own use, their acting without authority as to the real
property and real estate owning partnerships in which the corporation is sole surviving
general partner, and unauthorized transfer of corporate funds to their probate counsel.
A shareholder derivative actidn may follow after 90 days if sufficient action is not taken.
Sincerely,

y

/

i^/COpDER, Registered Agent
ym& Staircase Land Company
>iamond Fork Land Company

FIIED DISTRICT COUfiT
ROBERT f I. COPIER, 727
Attorney for Relator
200 Metro Place
243 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2803
Telephone 531-7923

Third Judicial 0<suiot
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m THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
fN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PAHL'S SALT PALACE LOAN
OFFICE, [NC, a Utah corporation,
ex rel. DIAMOND FORK LAND
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,

DEFAULT JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs
KALYNN NINOW, personal
representative of the estate of
Gary G. Pahl, deceased,

Civil No. 020908627
Judge Bruce C. Lubeck

Defendant.
Defendant's default having been entered, the court now grants default
judgment, and hereby, ORDERS, ADJUDGES, and DECREES, as follows:
I. All of defendant's claims to 3000 shares (50%) of the stock of Pahl's
Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc , a Utah corporation, arc hereby extinguished and the
legal and beneficial title to the said 3000 shares is hereby quieted in favor of the
plaintiffs successors to those shares as set forth in the case record, as follows.
Bangkok Birth Mothers Basic Education Trust
1500 shares
(With Bangkok Birth Mothers Trust for
Equity and Justice as the beneficial owner)

(2S%)

Bangkok Birth Mothers Advocacy Trust
1500 shares
(With Diamond Fork Land Company, a
Utah corporation, as the beneficial owner)

(25%)

2. No other or further writ or order shall be required and this default
judgment fully adjudicates any claims between the parties as to the 3000 shares
and fully and finally quiets the ownership of the 3000 shares as set forth above
3 In the event that plaintiff or any of plaintiffs successors to the 3000
shares shall deem it necessary to have defendant reasonably execute papers or
documents to vindicate and protect therightsof plaintiffs successors to the 3000
shares, defendant is hereby ORDERED to sign all such papers and documents.
4. As to the second claim for relief in the First Amended Complaint, it is
hereby decreed that any and all acts, filings* and transactions purportedly made or
entered into by or on behalf of Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, Inc., after the death
of Gary G. Pahl through the date of this judgment, as well as any actions that were
purportedly made or entered into by unanimous action of shareholders or by a
quorum of shareholders after the death of Gary G. Pahl through the date of this
judgment, which have not been expressly approved or ratified by a board of
directors upon which Augusta Rose and William Lowe served as directors, are
declared and decreed to be unauthorized, of no force or effect, and votdab tmcto
5. It is further decreed that no action, tiling, or transaction purportedly
made or entered into by or on behalf of Pahl's Salt Palace Loan Office, lncM from
and after the date of this judgment shall have any force or effect unless approved
or ratified by a board of directors upon which WUliam Lowe and Augusta Rose
serve as directors, until such time as their successors, if any, are duly qualified.
6 The third claim for relief is dismissed WITHOUT PREJUDICE,
DATED THIS , ^ ^ D A Y OF NOVEMBI
BY THE<

H
I!

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PAUL'S SALT PLACE LOAN
OFFICE, INC, a Utah corporation,
ex wl. DIAMOND LAND FORK
COMPANY, a Utah corporation,

RULING AND ORDER

Plaintiff,
vs.
KAYLYNN NINOW, personal
representative of the estate of
(Jury O, Paid, deceased, and
individually,

Case No. 02G9O«627

Judge Robert K* ITilder

Defendant

Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment is before the court for decision. The
parlies briefed the original Motion, and the court heard argument, at which time the court
indicated that it believed a Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Motion was time barred,
but that there might be grounds to set aside the judgment under Rule 60(a), or even under Rule
55, the underlying basis for a default judgment, pursuant to P & B Land v. Klungcrvik, 751 P.2d
274 (Ut. App. 1988), The parties were requested to submit supplemental briefs addressing the
issue raised by the court. Now, haviug reviewed the briefs and the applicable law, the court rules
as follows;
First, the court must exercise its option under Thurston v. Box Elder County and Trembly
v, Mrs Fields Cookies, to reconsider its previous decision regarding Rule 60(b), because the
court is persuaded that it was in error as to the law, and no final judgment has entered based on
the court's bench ruling of May 2,2003.
That is, the court is still persuaded that as to any Motion based on subsections (1), (2) or
(3) of Rule 60(b), including motions under 60(b)(6) that could have been brought pursuant to any
one uf the first three subsections, the time limit is three months, and the court has no discretion to

1

extend that time.
But, the court is now persuaded, based on the facts of this case and the very recent Utah
Court of Appeals decision, Osvgucra v. Farmers Insurance Exchanget 2003 UT App 46
(February 21,2003), that Rule 60(b)(6), URCP, provides a clear basis for relief from the default
judgment separate from grounds that may be asserted under thefirstthree subsections. As the
court explained at the hearing, there is no doubt in this court's mind that the entry of default
results solely from court error, probably even more manifestly than was the case in Oseguera.
Notwithstanding plaintiffs assertion that the default was proper because the responsive pleading
was late, at the date the clerk signed the default certificate (November 25,2002) and at the date
the court signed the default judgment (November 26,2002), a responsive pleading had been
filed. Hie responsive pleading may not have been physically in the court's file, but that was the
court's fault, ' The critical point is defendant had not "failed to plead or otherwise defend0 (Rule
55(a), URCP) at the time the default was sought.
In such a case, the clerk is not empowered to enter default, and there is ultimately no
basis for a judgment, and P & B Land makes it clear that the default is "improper or illegal, and
voidable." 751 P,2dat277, It makes no sense to consider such a judgment illegal and voidable
if (he court is nevertheless precluded from voiding the illegal judgment because defendant did
not comply strictly with a three month deadline. That is particularly true when, as here, the
deadline was missed by a relatively short time, and to some extent that was because plainliffdid
not give prompt notice of the judgment
The court still believes there may be u basis to set aside pursuant to Rule 60(a), URCP,
under facts such as these and/or under the court's inherent powers to correct its own errors,
particularly in light of the direction given by the Oseguera court:
When the trial court's mistakes-not counsel's-are the reason a judgment is
improvidently entered and the entry goes undetected, even if it remains undetected
for some time, the court should be anxious to whatever needs to done to fix the
mislakc as soon as it is called to the court's attention.
Wat Para, 12,
Despite this belief, based on its reconsideration of the availability of Rule 60(b)(6),
URCP, and based on the court's determination that defendant clearly acted within a reasonable
time altar becoming awaro of the default judgment, the court need not reach alternative bases.
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's Motion to set Aside default Judgment be and hereby is

1

Plaintiff may argue that the pleading was deficient in some way, but that is properly a
subject of another motion.
2

GRANTED and the Motion filed November 25,2002, is the responsive pleading to which
plaintiff may direct any future motions. To the extent the defendant's Motion seeks
consolidation of this case with the earlier filed cose before Judge Medley, that Motion must be
directed to Judge Medley, This signed Ruling shall be the ORDER of the court and no further
Order is required.
DATED this 12U| day of June, 2003..
By the

Court Judge

^

3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DIAMOND FORK LAND COMPANY vs.

DOES I-V

CASE NUMBER 020908627 Contracts

CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE
ROBERT K HILDER
PARTIES
Plaintiff - PAHL'S SALT PALACE LOAN
Represented by: ROBERT H COPIER
Plaintiff -

DIAMOND FORK LAND COMPANY

Defendant - KAYLYN NINOW
Defendant - DOES I-V
Represented by: DAVID C CONDIE
ACCOUNT SUMMARY
TOTAL REVENUE

Amount Due
Amount Paid
Credit
Balance

154.00
154.00
0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COMPLAINT - NO AMT S
Amount Due
140.00
Amount Paid
140.00
Amount Credit
0.00
Balance
0.00
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
Amount Due
Amount Paid
Amount Credit
Balance

0.50
0.50
0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
Amount Due
Amount Paid
Amount Credit
Balance

1.50
1.50
0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
Amount Due:

1.00

Printed: 04/26/04 16:43:00
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CASE NUMBER 020908627 Contracts
Amount Paid
Amount Credit
Balance

1.00
0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

2.00
2.00
0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

5.00
5.00
0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

2.50
2.50
0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

1.50
1.50
0.00
0.0 0

CASE NOTE
PROCEEDINGS
0 9 - 0 3 •02 Case filed by karries
0 9 - 0 3 02 Judge LUBECK assigned.
No Amount
0 9 - 0 3 02 Filed: Complaint
Total Due:
0 9 - 0 3 02 Fee Account created
Payment Received:
0 9 - 0 3 02 COMPLAINT - NO AMT S
0 9 - 0 4 02
0 9 - 0 7 02
1 0 - 1 8 02
1 0 - 2 4 -02

11-25-02
11-25-02

140.00

karries
karries
karries
karries
karries

14 0.00
Note: Code Description: COMPLAINT - NO AMT S
bryanp
Filed: First Amended Complaint
Judge HILDER assigned.
dpx
Filed: Share Transfer Notice
bryanp
Filed return: Summons
bryanp
Party Served NINOW, KAYLYN
Service Type Personal
Service Date October 19, 2002
Filed: Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Consolidate and/or
bryanp
Transfer Case to Judge Medley
Filed: Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss and Motion to
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bryanp
Consolidate and/or Transfer Case to Judge Medley
bryanp
11-26-02 Filed order: Default Judgment
Judge rhilder
Signed November 26, 2 002
betsyc
Total Due:
12-05 -02 Fee Account created
0.50
betsyc
Payment Received:
0.50
12-05--02 COPY FEE
bryanp
12-17- •02 Filed: Notice of Judgment
deborahw
1.50
02-11- •03 Fee Account created
Total Due:
deborahw
Payment Received:
1.50
02-11- -03 COPY FEE
lindav
03-17- -03 Filed: Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment
03-18- •03 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Motion to Set Aside Default
lindav
Judgment
03-24- -03 Filed: CJA 5-401 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion by
bryanp
Defendant to Set Aside the Default Judgment
03-31- •03 Filed: Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Set Aside
lindav
Default Judgment
04-03- 03 Filed: Exhibits to Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Set
lindav
Aside Default Judgment
lindav
04-08- 03 Filed: Memorandum in Support of the Motion to Strike
lindav
04-08- 03 Filed Motion to Strike
bryanp
04-11- 03 Filed Notice to Submit
04-14- 03 Filed Memorandum in Support of Emergency Ex Parte Motion to
lindav
Stay Execution or Enforcement of Default Judgment
lindav
04-14- 03 Filed: Notice of Hearing
04-14- 03 Filed: Emergency Ex Parte Motion to Stay Execution or
lindav
Enforcement of Default Judgment
04-14- 03 Tracking started for Under advisement
Review date Jun 13,
bryanp
2003.
04-14- 03 Notice - NOTICE for Case 020908627 ID 5576911
bryanp
MOTION TO SET ASIDE is scheduled.
Date: 04/29/2003
Time: 10:30 a.m.
Location: Third Floor - S34
Third District Court
450 South State Street
SLC, UT 84111-1860
Before Judge ROBERT K HILDER
04-14-03 MOTION TO STAY scheduled on April 15 2003 at 10:00 AM in Third
Floor - S34 with Judge HILDER.
bryanp
04-14-03 MOTION TO SET ASIDE scheduled on April 29, 2003 at 10:30 AM in
Third Floor - S34 with Judge HILDER.
bryanp
04-15-03 Minute Entry - Minutes for MOTION TO STAY
lindav
Judge:
ROBERT K HILDER
Clerk:
lindav
PRESENT
Defendant(s): KAYLYN NINOW
DOES I-V
Defendant's Attorney(s): DAVID CONDIE
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SANDY WEEKS
Video
Tape Count: 10:08

HEARING
COUNT: 10:08
David Condie's argument.
COUNT: 10:10
Sandy Week's statement.
COUNT: 10:11
Court ordered execution on judgment stayed pending 4/29/2003
hearing on motion to set aside. Mr. Condie to prepaie order.
04-15- 03 Filed: Order Granting Stay of Execution or Enforcemert of
Default Judgment
04-16- 03 Filed: Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Strike Feply
Memorandum and Supporting Exhibits
04-16- •03 Filed: Certificate of Service of Order Granting Stay
04-17- •03 Filed: Request to Continue April 29, 2003 Hearing
04-17- •03 Filed: Memorandum in Support of the Motion to Lift Stay
04-17- •03 Filed: Motion to Lift Stay
04-19- •03 Filed: Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Strike
04-21- •03 MOTION TO SET ASIDE scheduled on May 02, 2003 at 02:00 PM in
Third Floor - S34 with Judge HILDER
04-21- •03 Notice - NOTICE for Case 020908627 ID 5582413
MOTION TO SET ASIDE is scheduled.
Date: 05/02/2003
Time- 02:00 p.m.
Location: Third Floor - S34
Third District Court
450 South State Street
SLC, UT 84111-1860
Before Judge: ROBERT K HILDER
04-21 •03 MOTION TO SET ASIDE Cancelled.
05-02 •03 Minute Entry - Minutes for MOTION TO SET ASIDE
Judge:
ROBERT K HILDER
Clerk:
lindav
PRESENT
Plaintiff(s): PAHL'S SALT PALACE LOAN
DIAMOND FORK LAND COMPANY
Defendant(s): RYAN PAHL
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): ROBERT H COPIER
Defendant's Attorney(s): DAVID CONDIE
Video
Tape Count: 2:07
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bryanp
Lindav
Lindav
Lindav
Lindav
Lindav
Lindav
bryanp
bryanp

Lindav

CASE NUMBER 020908627 Contracts

HEARING
COUNT: 2:07
Discussion regarding Ryan Pahl.
COUNT: 2:08
Court order stay to remain in place and simultaneous briefs to be
submitted by May 14, 2 003. Either party may submit the notice to
submit.
Court ordered 60 B motion denied. Mr. Copier to prepare
order.
COUNT: 2:20
Deft argument
COUNT: 2:24
Court statement.
COUNT: 2:20
Deft argument.
COUNT: 2:24
Court statement.
05-09-03
05-09-03
05-14-03
05-15-03

05-15-03
05-20- •03
05-22- •03
05-22- 03
05-28- 03
06-11- 03
06-12- 03
06-16- 03
06-16- 03

06-18- 03
06-18- 03
07-02- 03
07-02- 03
07-02- 03
07-07-03

betsyc
Fee Account created
Total Due:
1.00
betsyc
COPY FEE
Payment Received:
1.00
lindav
Filed: Plaintiff's Memorandum RE: Relief Under URCP 60(a)
Filed: Copy of first page of Supplemental Memorandum in Support
of Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment (Showing date stamp and
lindav
time)
Filed Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion to Set
lindav
Aside Default Judgment
lindav
Filed Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Lift Stay
Filed Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum in RE: URCP 60(a) Relief lindav
lindav
Filed Notice to Submit for Court Decision
Tracking started for Under advisement. Review date Jul 27,
2003.
lindav
Tracking ended for Under advisement.
bryanp
Minute Entry - MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER
Commissioner:
bryanp
Tracking ended for Under advisement.
bryanp
Filed order: Ruling and Order
Judge
rhilder
Signed June 12, 2003
2.00
betsyc
Fee Account created
Total Due:
betsyc
COPY FEE
Payment Received:
2.00
Filed: Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate the Order Setting Aside the
lindav
Default Judgment
lindav
Filed: Affidavit of Robert Henry Copier
Filed: Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate
the Order Setting Aside the Default Judgment
lindav
Fee Account created
Total Due:
5.00
karries
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Payment Received:
5.00
07-07--03 COPY FEE
07-07--03 Filed: Notice to Submit Motion to Dismiss
07-08--03 Tracking started for Under advisement. Review date Sep 06,

karries
lindav

2 0 03.
lindav
07-15-03 Filed: Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Vacate the Order
Setting Aside the Default Judgment
lindav
lindav
07--21--03 Filed Ovjwxrion ro rhw Notice to Submit for Decision
07--23--03 Filed Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion to Strike
lindav
lindav
07--23--03 Filed Motion to Strike
lindav
07--29--03 Filed Notice RE: "BFP" Owners
lindav
07--29--03 Filed Reply Affidavit of Robert Henry Copier
07--29--03 Filed Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Vacaite the
Order Setting Aside the Default Judgment
lindav
bryanp
07--30--03 Track ng ended for Under advisement.
08--11--03 Note: ***As per Judge Hilder, since the filing of the Notice to
Submit in this matter, there has been ai lot of activity, which
makes the Notice to Submit ineffective. Court will wait for a
bryanp
new Notice to Submit before ruling.***
2.5 0
deborahw
Total Due:
08-18- 03 Fee Account created
2.50
deborahw
08-18- 03 COPY FEE
Payment Received:
09-13- 03 Filed: Notice of Change of Mailing Address of Relator's Counselbryanp
kathys
10-07- 03 Note: Record returned:
2 files
10-07- 03 Filed: Letter from Court of Appeals: record being returned.
kathys
No indexing requested.
deborahw
03-03- 04 Fee Account created
Total Due:
1.50
deborahw
03-03- 04 COPY FEE
Payment Received:
1.50
lindav
03-12- 04 Filed: Motion to Dismiss
03-12- 04 Filed: Memorandum in Support of the Motion to Dismiss
lindav
04-02- 04 Filed: Request to Submit Motion for Decision
lindav
04-05- 04 Tracking started for Under advisement. Review date Jun 04
lindav
2004.
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June 9,2004, letter to Judge Medley.

LAW OFFICES

JVOBERT HENRY
C^
ENRY\^OPIER
ATTORNEY AND CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT
ADMITTED TO PRACTICE BEFORE THE UNITED STATES TAX COURT.
THE UNITED STATES TENTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS, AND
ALL FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS WITHIN COLORADO AND UTAH.
COLORADO BAR NUMBER 35469
UTAH BAR NUMBER 727
SALT LAKE CITY MAIL
17 EAST 400 SOUTH
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111

SALT LAKE
DENVER
TOLL FREE

(801) 531-0099
(303) 337-0099
(888) 737-0099

June 9, 2004
Hon. Tyrone E. Medley
Third District Court
450 South State Street
Salt Lake City UT 84111
Re: Estate of Gary G. Pahl
Probate No. 003901101
Dear Judge Medley:
Since Steven E. Tyler's objection and proposed order datted June 8, 2004, were submitted
directly to Your Honor, this response by William Lowe and Augusta Rose to liis objection
is submitted directly to Your Honor. My clients agree with Mr. Tyler that his objection
should be SUSTAINED and they do so without waiving their position that the proceeding
commenced in May of 2002 was concluded by the entry of summary judgment on May 1,
2003, and that there is currently no formal proceeding pending before this court within
which tofilemotions for summary judgment, let alone serve same upon Mr. Tyler's clients
by mailing copies to him. I utilized the mailing certificates employed by KaLynn Ninow's
counsel in order to inform all of the persons thereon of my clients' position and havefileda
cross-motion and response to KaLynn Ninow's summary judgment motion without waiving
die position that her motion is not properly before the court. It should here be noted that a
similar failure by KaLynn Ninow to properly join parties prior to the entry of Your Honor's
ay 1, 2003, summary judgment severely limits that order's jurisdictional reach and effect.
Respectfully
RdBERX^NRY/COl
^counselOTTuiemailing certificate

